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Spam!: that’s what Lorrie Faith Cranor and Brian LaMacchia ex-
claimed in the title of a popular call-to-action article that appeared
twenty years ago on Communications of the ACM [10]. And yet,
despite the tremendous efforts of the research community over the
last two decades to mitigate this problem, the sense of urgency
remains unchanged, as emerging technologies have brought new
dangerous forms of digital spam under the spotlight. Furthermore,
when spam is carried out with the intent to deceive or influence
at scale, it can alter the very fabric of society and our behavior. In
this article, I will briefly review the history of digital spam: starting
from its quintessential incarnation, spam emails, to modern-days
forms of spam affecting the Web and social media, the survey will
close by depicting future risks associated with spam and abuse of
new technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (e.g., Digital Hu-
mans). After providing a taxonomy of spam, and its most popular
applications emerged throughout the last two decades, I will review
technological and regulatory approaches proposed in the literature,
and suggest some possible solutions to tackle this ubiquitous digital
epidemic moving forward.
1 TYPES OF SPAM
An omni-comprehensive, universally-acknowledged definition of
digital spam is hard to formalize. Laws and regulation attempted to
define particular forms of spam, e.g., email (cf., 2003’sControlling the
Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act.) However,
nowadays, spam occurs in a variety of forms, and across different
techno-social systems. Each domain may warrant a slight different
definition that suits what spam is in that precise context: some
features of spam in a domain, e.g., volume in mass spam campaigns,
may not apply to others, e.g., carefully targeted phishing operations.
In an attempt to propose a general taxonomy, I here define digi-
tal spam as the attempt to abuse of, or manipulate, a techno-social
system by producing and injecting unsolicited, and/or undesired con-
tent aimed at steering the behavior of humans or the system itself,
at the direct or indirect, immediate or long-term advantage of the
spammer(s).
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This broad definition will allow me to track, in an inclusive
manner, the evolution of digital spam across its most popular appli-
cations, starting from spam emails to modern-days spam. For each
highlighted application domain, I will dive deep to understand the
nuances of different digital spam strategies, including their intents
and catalysts and, from a technical standpoint, how they are carried
out and how they can be detected.
Wikipedia provides an extensive list of domains of application:
``While the most widely recognized form of spam is email spam,
the term is applied to similar abuses in other media: instant
messaging spam, Usenet newsgroup spam, Web search engine spam,
spam in blogs, wiki spam, online classified ads spam, mobile
phone messaging spam, Internet forum spam, junk fax
transmissions, social spam, spam mobile apps, television
advertising and file sharing spam''.
(cf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Spamming)
Table 1 summarizes a few examples of types of spam and relative
context, including whereas there exist machine-learning solutions
(ML) to each problem. Email is known to be historically the first ex-
ample of digital spam (cf. Figure 1) and remains uncontested in scale
and pervasiveness with billions of spam emails generated every
day [10]. In the late 1990s, spam landed on instant messaging (IM)
platforms (SPIM) starting from AIM (AOL Instant Messenger™) and
evolving through modern-days IM systems such as WhatsApp™,
Facebook Messenger™, WeChat™, etc. A widespread form of spam
that emerged in the same period was Web search engine manip-
ulation: content spam and link farms allowed spammers to boost
the position of a target Website in the search result rankings of
popular search engines, by gaming algorithms like PageRank and
the like. With the success of the Social Web [22], in the early 2000s
we witnessed the rise of many new forms of spam, including Wiki
spam (injecting spam links into Wikipedia pages [1]), opinion and
review spam (promoting or smearing products by generating fake
online reviews [27]), and mobile messaging spam (SMS and text
Spam Type Start Today’s Volume ML Ref
Email 1978 Billions x day ✓ [10]
Instant Messaging 1997 Millions x day ✓ [20]
Search Engine 1998 Unknown ✓ [31]
Wiki 2001 Thousands x day - [1]
Opinion & Reviews 2005 Millions across platforms ✓ [11]
Mobile Messaging 2007 Millions x day ✓ [3]
Social Bots 2010 Millions across platforms ✓ [16]
False News 2016 Thousands across Websites - [36]
Multimedia 2018 Unknown - [25]
Table 1: Examples of types of spam and relative statistics.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
8.
06
17
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  1
4 A
ug
 20
19
Communications of the ACM , August 2019, Vol. 62 No. 8, Pages 82-91 E. Ferrara
8642
18
98
Ea
rly
 1
90
0s
M
id
 1
99
0s
20
00
s
M
id
 2
00
0s
19
78
19
95
Ea
rly
 2
00
0s
Advertisement based on 
unsolicited content has 
been mailed to our doors 
by Post Mail services for 
over a century!
POST MAIL
The New York Times 
reports of unsolicited 
messages circulating 
in association with an 
old swindle.
THE SPANISH 
PRISONER The first reported case of 
email spam is attributed 
to Digital Equipment 
Corporation and 
circulated to 400 
ARPANET users.
ARPANET
A growing fraction of 
emails is spam. 
Platforms and ISPs 
start investing in 
spam filtering 
techniques.
THE EMAIL 
EPIDEMIC
Web content spam and 
link farms are common 
forms of spamdexing, the 
manipulation of Web 
search result ranking.
SEARCH ENGINES
The rise of Facebook, 
Twitter, and Reddit 
leads to new 
opportunities for 
spammers to reach 
billions of Social Web 
users.
SOCIAL 
NETWORKS
Giants of e-
commerce like 
Amazon and 
Alibaba fight the 
manipulation of 
product popularity 
by opinion spam.
FAKE REVIEWS
Social engineering 
and disguise may 
allow attackers to 
trick victims into 
revealing sensitive 
information. 
Ransomware are 
used to extort funds 
from the victims.
PHISHING
Spam Websites are 
created to 
deliberately 
propagate false news 
related to politics, 
public health, and 
social issues.
FALSE NEWS
Systems based on AI can 
manipulate reality, 
producing indistinguishable 
alternatives. AIs can also be 
target of manipulation and 
spam to elicit behaviors of 
the AI system or of its users.
AI SPAM
Millions of accounts 
operated by software 
populate social 
media to carry out 
nefarious spam 
campaigns.
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2018+
Ea
rly
 2
01
0s
10
M
id
 2
01
0s
Figure 1: Timeline of the major milestones in the history of spam, from its inception to modern days.
messages sent directly to mobile devices [3]). Ultimately, in the last
decade, with the increasing pervasiveness of online social networks
and the significant advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), new
forms of spam involve social bots (accounts operated by software
to interact at scale with Social Web users [16]), false news Websites
(to deliberately spread disinformation [36]), and multimedia spam
based on AI [25].
In the following, I will focus on three of these domains: email
spam, Web spam (specifically, opinion spam and fake reviews),
and social spam (with a focus on social bots). Furthermore, I will
highlight the existence of a new form of spam that I will call AI
spam. I will provide examples of spam in this new domain, and lay
out the risks associated with it and possible mitigation strategies.
2 FLOODED BY JUNK EMAILS
2.1 The Origins of Email Spam
Cranor and LaMacchia [10], in their 1998’s Communications of the
ACM article, characterized the problem of junk emails, or email
spam, as one of the earliest forms of digital spam.
Email spam has mainly two purposes, namely advertising (e.g.,
promoting products, services, or contents), and frauds (e.g., attempt-
ing to perpetrate scams, or phishing). Neither ideas were particu-
larly new or unique to the digital realm: advertisement based on
unsolicited content delivered by traditional post mail (and, later,
phone calls, including more recently the so-called “robo-calls”) has
been around for nearly a century. As for scams, the first reports of
the popular advance-fee scam (in modern days known as 419 scam,
a.k.a. the Nigerian Prince scam), called the Spanish Prisoner scam
were circulating in the late 1800s.1
The first reported case of digital spam occurred in 1978 and
was attributed to Digital Equipment Corporation, who announced
their new computer system to over 400 subscribers of ARPANET,
the precursor network of modern Internet (see Figure 1). The first
mass email campaign occurred in 1994, known as the USENET green
card lottery spam: the law firm of Canter & Siegel advertised their
immigration-related legal services simultaneously to over six thou-
sand USENET newsgroups. This event contributed to popularizing
the term spam. Both the ARPANET and USENET cases brought
serious consequences to their perpetrators as they were seen as
egregious violations of common code of conduct in the early days
of the Internet (for example, Canter & Siegel ran out of business
and Canter was disbarred by the Arizona bar association.) However,
things were bound to change as the Internet became an increasingly
more pervasive technology in our society.
2.2 Email Spam: Risks and Challenges
The use of the Internet for distributing unsolicited messages pro-
vides unparalleled scalability, and unprecedented reach, at a cost
that is infinitesimal compared to what it would take to accomplish
the same results via traditional means [10]. These three conditions
created the ideal conjecture of economical incentives that made
email spam so pervasive.
1See The New York Times, March 20, 1898: https://www.nytimes.com/1898/03/20/
archives/an-old-swindle-revived-the-spanish-prisoner-and-buried-treasure.html
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In contrast to old-school post mail spam, digital email spam in-
troduced a number of unique challenges [10]: (i) if left unfiltered,
spam emails can easily outnumber legitimate ones, overwhelming
the recipients and thus rendering the email experience from un-
pleasant to unusable; (ii) email spam often contains explicit content
that can hurt the sensibility of the recipients—depending upon the
sender/recipient country’s laws, perpetrating this form of spam
could constitute a criminal offense;2 (iii) by embedding HTML or
Javascript code into spam emails, the spammers can emulate the look
and feel of legitimate emails, tricking the recipients and eliciting
unsuspecting behaviors, thus enacting scams or enabling phishing
attacks [23]; finally, (iv) mass spam operations pose a burden on
Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which have to process and route
unnecessary, and often large, amounts of digital junk information
to millions of recipients—for the larger spam campaigns, even more.
The Internet was originally designed by and for tech-savvy users:
spammers quickly developed ways to take advantage of the unso-
phisticated ones. Phishing is the practice of using deception and
social engineering strategies by which attackers manage to trick
victims by disguising themselves as a trusted entity [9, 23]. The
end goal of phishing attacks is duping the victims into revealing
sensitive information for identity theft, or extorting funds via ran-
somware or credit card frauds. Email has been by far and large the
most common vector of phishing attacks. In 2006, Indiana Univer-
sity carried out a study to quantify the effectiveness of phishing
emails [23]. The researchers demonstrated that a malicious attacker
impersonating the university would have a 16% success rate in ob-
taining the users’ credentials when the phishing email came from
an unknown sender; however, success rate arose to 72% when the
email came from an attacker impersonating a friend of the victim.
2.3 Fighting Email Spam
Over the course of the last two decades, solutions to the problem of
email spam revolved around implementing new regulatory policies,
increasingly sophisticated technical hurdles, and combinations of
the two [10]. Regarding the former, in the context of the U.S. or
the European Union (EU), policies that regulate access to personal
information (including email addresses), such as the EU’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) enacted in 2018, hinder the
ability of bulk mailers based in EU countries to effectively carry
out mass email spam operations without risks and possibly serious
consequences. However, it has become increasingly more obvious
that solutions based exclusively on regulatory affairs are ineffective:
spam operations can move to countries with less restrictive Internet
regulations. However, regulatory approaches in conjunction with
technical solutions have brought significant progress in the fight
against email spam.
From a technical standpoint, two decades of research advance-
ments led to sophisticated techniques that strongly mitigate the
amount of spam emails ending up in the intended recipients’ in-
boxes. A number of review papers have been published that sur-
veyed data mining and machine learning approaches to detect and
filter out email spam [7], some with a specific focus on scams and
phishing spam [21].
2E.g., see the U.S. Federal Law on Obscenity https://www.justice.gov/criminal-ceos/
citizens-guide-us-federal-law-obscenity
In the Sidebar: Detecting Spam Emails, I summarize some of the
technical milestones accomplished in the quest to identify spam
emails. Unfortunately, I suspect that much of the state-of-the-art
research on spam detection lies behind close curtains, mainly for
three reasons: (i) large email-related service providers, such as
Google (Gmail™), Microsoft (Outlook™ , Hotmail™), Cisco (Iron-
Port™, Email Security Appliance—ESA™), etc., devote(d) massive
R&D investments to develop machine learning methods to auto-
matically filter out spam in the platforms they operate (Google,
Microsoft, etc.) or protect (Cisco); the companies are thus often in-
centivized to use patented and close-sourced solutions to maintain
their competitive advantage; (ii) related to the former point, fight-
ing email spam is a continuous arms-race: revealing one’s spam
filtering technology gives out information that can be exploited by
the spammers to create more sophisticated campaigns that can ef-
fectively and systematically escape detection, thus calling for more
secrecy. Finally, (iii) the accuracy of email spam detection systems
deployed by these large service providers has been approaching
nearly-perfect detection: a diminishing return mechanism comes
into play where additional efforts to further refine detection algo-
rithms may not warrant the costs of developing increasingly more
sophisticated techniques fueling complex spam detection systems;
this makes established approaches even more valuable and trusted,
thus motivating the secrecy of their functioning.
3 WEB 2.0 OR SPAM 2.0?
The new millennium brought us the Social Web, or Web 2.0, a para-
digm shift with an emphasis on user-generated content and on the
participatory, interactive nature of the Web experience [22]. From
knowledge production (Wikipedia) to personalized news (social
media) and social groups (online social networks), from blogs to
image and video sharing sites, from collaborative tagging to social
e-commerce, this wealth of new opportunities brought us as many
new forms of spam, commonly referred to as social spam.
Differently from spam emails, where spam can only be conveyed
in one form (i.e., emails), social spam can appear in multiple forms
andmodi operandi. Social spam can be in the form of textual content
(e.g., a secretly-sponsored post on social media), or multimedia (e.g.,
a manufactured photo on 4chan); social spam can aim at pointing
users to unreliable resources, e.g., URLs to unverified information
or false news Websites [36]; social spam can aim at altering the
popularity of digital entities, e.g., by manipulating user votes (up-
votes on Reddit™ posts, retweets on Twitter™), and even that of
physical products, e.g., by posting fake online reviews (e.g., about a
product on an e-commerce Website).
3.1 Spammy Opinions
In the early 2000s (cf. Figure 1), the growing popularity of e-commerce
Websites like Amazon and Alibaba motivated the emergence of
opinion spam (a.k.a. review spam) [24, 27].
According to Liu [27], there are three types of spam reviews:
(i) fake reviews, (ii) reviews about brands only, and (iii) non-reviews.
The first type of spam, fake reviews, consists of posting untruthful,
or deceptive reviews on online e-commerce platforms, in an attempt to
manipulate the public perception (in a positive or negative manner) of
specific products or services presented on the affected platform(s). Fake
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Email spam detection is an arms-race between attackers
(spammers) and defenders (service providers). Two decades
of research in the data mining and machine learning commu-
nities produced troves of techniques to tackle this problem.
Some milestones include:
SMTP solutions. SMTP is the protocol at the foundation of
the email exchange infrastructure. Blacklists were intro-
duced to keep track of spam propagators [7]. Mail servers
can consult blacklisting services to determine whether to
route emails to their destination. A softer version of black-
listing is greylisting. Greylists keep track of triplets of IP
addresses (sender, receiver, STMP host) involved into an email
exchange. The first time a triplet involving a dubious SMTP
host appears, the exchange is denied, but the triplet is stored
to authorize future exchanges. This is based on the ratio-
nale that spammers rarely retry sending spam through the
same relay, and was proven effective in reducing early spam
circulation [7]. Another approach is keyword-based filter-
ing: whenever the subject or the body of an email contains
flagged terms (belonging to a keyword list), the SMTP ser-
vice provider would not route it to its intended recipient,
and flag the sending offender — multiple offenses would lead
to permanent bans. Other strategies like DomainKeys Iden-
tified Mail (DKIM) and digital signatures are authentication
methods designed to detect email spoofing and assess email
provenance.
Supervised learning. In their seminal work, Drucker et al.
[13] proposed one of the first machine learning systems for
spam detection, based on Support Vector Machines (then
the state of the art in terms of supervised learning). The
success of supervised learning over traditional keyword-
based filters demonstrated by Drucker et al. [13] motivated
the first wave of machine learning research in email spam
detection. Shortly after, Androutsopoulos et al. [4] showed
the power of naive Bayesian anti-spam filtering: Bayesian
systems yielded state-of-the-art spam detection performance
for many years. The advent of more sophisticated learning
models, like boosting trees, set the accuracy bar higher but
paradigm shifts lagged for nearly a decade.
Hybrid neural systems. More recently, Wu [37] proposed
behavior-based spam detection using combinations of simple
association rules and neural networks. Given their ability to
naturally handle visual information, neural network methods
to detect spam were extended to multimedia content. For ex-
ample, Wu et al. [38] and Fumera et al. [17] proposed meth-
ods exploiting visual cues to detect spam content injected in
images embedded into emails.
Dedicated hardware. Networking companies are developing
anti-spam appliances. Dedicated hardware can detect various
types of spam, including phishing, malware, and ransomware,
guaranteeing high efficiency and accuracy. For example,
Cisco advertises that their Email Security Appliance (ESA™)
detects over 99.9% of incoming spam email with lower than 1
in a million false positive rate.
Detecting Spam Emails positive reviews can be used to enhance the popularity and positive
perception of the product(s) or service(s) the spammer intends to
promote, while fake negative reviews can contribute to smear the
spammer’s competitor(s) and their products/services. Opinion spam
of the second type, reviews about brands only, pertains comments
on the manufacturer/brand of a product but not on the product
itself—albeit genuine, according to Liu [27] they are considered
spam because they are not targeted at specific products and are often
biased. Finally, spam reviews of the third type, non-reviews, are
technically not opinion spam as they do not provide any opinion,
they only contain generic, unrelated content (e.g., advertisement, or
questions, rather than reviews, about a product). Fake reviews are,
by far and large, the most common type of opinion spam, and the
one that has received more attention in the research community
[27]. Furthermore, Jindal and Liu [24] showed that spam of the
second and third type is simple to detect and address.
Unsurprisingly, the practice of opinion spam, and in particular
fake reviews, is widely considered as unfair and deceptive, and
as such it has been subject of extensive legal scrutiny and court
battles. If left unchecked, opinion spam can poison a platform and
negatively affect both customers and platform providers (including
incurring in financial losses for both parties, as customers may
be tricked into purchasing undesirable items and grow frustrated
against the platform), at the sole advantage of the spammer (or the
entity they represent)—as such, depending on the country’s laws,
opinion spam may qualify as a form of digital fraud.
Detecting fake reviews is complex for a variety of reasons: for
example, spam reviews can be posted by fake or real user accounts.
Furthermore, they can be posted by individual users or even group
of users [27, 30]. Spammers can deliberately use fake accounts on
e-commerce platforms, created only with the scope of posting fake
reviews. Fortunately, fake accounts on e-commerce platforms are
generally easy to detect, as they engage in intense reviewing ac-
tivity without any product purchases. An alternative and more
complex scenario occurs when fake reviews are posted by real
users. This tends to occur under two very different circumstances:
(i) compromised accounts (i.e., accounts originally owned by le-
gitimate users that have been hacked and sold to spammers) are
frequently re-purposed and utilized in opinion spam campaigns
[11]; (ii) fake review markets became very popular where real users
collude in exchange for direct payments to write untruthful re-
views (e.g., without actually purchasing or trying a given product
or service). To complicate this matter, researchers showed that fake
personas, e.g., Facebook profiles, can be created and associated
with such spam accounts [18]. During the late 2000s, many online
fake-review markets emerged, whose legality was battled in court
by e-commerce giants. Action on both legal and technical fronts
has helped mitigating the problem of opinion spam.
From a technical standpoint, a variety of techniques have been
proposed to detect review spam. Liu [27] identified three main
approaches, namely supervised, unsupervised, and group spam de-
tection. In supervised spam detection, the problem of separating fake
from genuine (non-fake) reviews is formulated as a classification
problem. Jindal and Liu [24] pointed out that the main challenge of
this task is to work around the shortage of labeled training data. To
address this problem, the authors exploited the fact that spammers,
to minimize their work, often produce (near-)duplicate reviews,
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that can be used as examples of fake reviews. Feature engineer-
ing and analysis was key to build informative features of genuine
and fake reviews, enriched by features of the reviewing users and
the reviewed products. Models based on Logistic Regression have
been proven successful in detecting untruthful opinions in large
corpora of Amazon reviews [24]. Detection algorithms based on
Support Vector Machines or Naive Bayes models generally per-
form well (above 98% accuracy) and scale to production systems
[29]. These pipelines are often enhanced by human-in-the-loop
strategies, where annotators recruited through Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk (or similar crowd-sourcing services) manually label subsets
of reviews to separate genuine from fake ones, to feed online learn-
ing algorithms so to constantly adapt to new strategies and spam
techniques [11, 27].
Unsupervised spam detection was used both to detect spammers
as well as for detecting fake reviews. Liu [27] reported on meth-
ods based on detecting anomalous behavioral patterns typical of
spammers. Models of spam behaviors include targeting products,
targeting groups (of products or brands), general and early rating
deviations [27]. Methods based on association rules can capture
atypical behaviors of reviewers, detecting anomalies in reviewers’
confidence, divergence from average product scores, entropy (di-
versity or homogeneity) of attributed scores, temporal dynamics,
etc. [39]. For what concerns the unsupervised detection of fake
reviews, linguistic analysis was proved useful to identify stylistic
features of fake reviews e.g., language markers that are over- or
under-represented in fake reviews. Opinion spam to promote prod-
ucts, for example, exhibits on average three times fewer mentions
of social words, negative sentiment, and long words (> 6 letters)
than genuine reviews, while containing twice more positive terms
and references to self than formal texts [11].
Concluding, group spam detection aims at identifying signatures
of collusion among spammers [30]. Collective behaviors such as
spammers’ coordination can emerge by using combinations of fre-
quent pattern mining and group anomaly ranking. In the first stage,
the algorithm proposed by Mukherjee et al. [30] identifies groups
of reviewers who all have reviewed a same set of products—such
groups are flagged as potentially suspicious. Then, anomaly scores
for individual and group behaviors are computed and aggregated,
accounting for indicators that measure the group burstiness (i.e.,
writing reviews in short timespan), group reviews similarity, etc.
Groups are finally ranked in terms of their anomaly scores [30].
3.2 The Rise of Spam Bots
Up to the early 2000s, most of the spam activity was still coordinated
and carried out, at least in significant part, by human operators:
email spam campaigns, Web link farms, fake reviews, etc. all rely
on human intervention and coordination. In other words, these
spam operations scale at a (possibly significant) cost. With the rise
in popularity of online social network and social media platforms
(see Figure 1), new forms of spam started to emerge at scale. One
such example is social link farms [19]: similarly to Web link farms,
whose goal is to manipulate the perception of popularity of a certain
Website by artificially creating many pointers (hyperlinks) to it, in
social link farming spammers create online personas with many
artificial followers. This type of spam operation requires creating
thousands (or more) of accounts that will be used to follow a target
user in order to boost its apparent influence. Such “disposable ac-
counts” are often referred to as fake followers as their purpose is
solely to participate in such link-farming networks. In some plat-
forms, link farming was so pervasive that spammers reportedly
controlled millions of fake accounts [19]. Link farming introduced
a first level of automation in social media spam, namely the tools
to automatically create large swaths of social media accounts.
In the late 2000s, social spam obtained a new potent tool to
exploit: bots (short for software robots, a.k.a. social bots). In my
2016 CACM review titled The Rise of Social Bots [16], I noted that
“bots have been around since the early days of computers”: examples
of bots include chatbots, algorithms designed to hold a conversation
with a human, Web bots, to automate the crawling and indexing
of the Web, trading bots, to automate stock market transactions,
and much more. Although isolated examples exist of such bots
being used for nefarious purposes, I am unaware of any reports of
systematic abuse carried out by bots in those contexts.
A social bot is a new breed of “computer algorithm that automat-
ically produces content and interacts with humans on the Social
Web, trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior.” Since bots
can be programmed to carry out arbitrary operations that would
otherwise be tedious or time-consuming (thus expensive) for hu-
mans, they allowed to scale spam operations on the Social Web to
an unprecedented level. Bots, in other words, are the dream spam-
mers have been dreaming of since the early days of the Internet:
they allow for personalized, scalable interactions, increasing the
cost effectiveness, reach, and plausibility of social spam campaigns,
with the added advantage of increased credibility and the ability
to escape detection achieved by their human-like disguise. Fur-
thermore, with the democratization and popularization of machine
learning and AI technologies, the entry barrier to creating social
bots has significantly lowered [16]. Since social bots have been
used in a variety of nefarious scenarios (see Sidebar: Social Spam
Applications), from the manipulation of political discussion, to the
spread of conspiracy theories and false news, and even by extremist
groups for propaganda and recruitment, the stakes are high in the
quest to characterize bot behavior and detect them [35].3
Maybe due to their fascinating morphing and disguising nature,
spam bots have attracted the attention of the AI and machine learn-
ing research communities: the arms-race between spammers and
detection systems yielded technical progress on both the attacker’s
and the defender’s technological fronts. Recent advancements in
Artificial Intelligence (especially Artificial Neural Networks) fuel
bots that can generate human-like natural language and interact
with human users in near real time [16, 35]. On the other hand, the
cyber-security and machine-learning communities came together
to develop techniques to detect the signature of artificial activity of
bots and social network sybils [16, 40].
In [16], we flashed out techniques used to both create spam
bots, and detect them. Although the degree of sophistication of
such bots, and therefore their functionalities, varies vastly across
3It should be noted that bots are not used exclusively for nefarious purposes: for
example, some researchers used bots for positive health behavioral interventions [16].
Furthermore, it has been noted that the most problematic aspect of nefarious bots is
their attempt to deceive and disguise themselves as human users [16]: however, many
bots are labeled as such and may provide useful services, like live-news updates, etc.
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platforms and application domains, commonalities also emerge.
Simple bots can do unsophisticated operations, such as posting
content according to a schedule, or interact with others according
to pre-determined scripts, whereas complex bots can motivate their
reasoning and react to further human scrutiny. Beyond anecdotal
evidence, there is no systematic way to survey the state of AI-
fueled spam bots and consequently their capabilities—researchers
adjust their expectations based on advancements made public in
AI technologies (with the assumptions that these will be abused
by spammers with the right incentives and technical means), and
based on proof-of-concept tools that are often originally created
with other non-nefarious purposes in mind (one such example is
the so-called DeepFakes, discussed more later).
In the Sidebar: Social Spam Applications, I highlight some of the
domains where bots made the headlines: one such example is the
wake to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, during which Twitter
and Facebook bots have been used to sow chaos and further polar-
ize the political discussion [6]. Although it is not always possible
for the research community to pinpoint the culprits, the research
of my group, among many others, contributed to unveil anomalous
communication dynamics that attracted further scrutiny by law
enforcement and were ultimately connected to state-sponsored op-
erations (if you wish, a form of social spam aimed at influencing in-
dividual behavior). Spam bots operate in other highly-controversial
conversation domains: in the context of public health, they promote
products or spread scientifically unsupported claims [2, 15]; they
have been used to create spam campaigns to manipulate the stock
market [15]; finally, bots have also been used to penetrate online
social circles to leak personal user information [18].
4 AI SPAM
Artificial Intelligence has been advancing at vertiginous speed, rev-
olutionizing many fields including spam. Beyond powering conver-
sational agents such as social bots, as discussed above, AI systems
can be used, beyond their original scope, to fuel spam operations of
different sorts. I will refer to this phenomenon next as spamming
with AI, hinting to the fact that AI is used as a tool to create new
forms of spams. However, given their sophistication, AI systems can
themselves be subject of spam attacks. I will refer to this new con-
cept as spamming into AI, suggesting that AIs can be manipulated,
and even compromised, by spammers (or attackers in a broader
sense) to exhibit anomalous and undesirable behaviors.
4.1 Spamming with AI
Advancements in computer vision, augmented and virtual realities
are projecting us in an era where the boundary between reality
and fiction is increasingly more blurry. Proofs-of-concept of AIs ca-
pable to analyze and manipulate video footages, learning patterns
of expressions, already exist: Suwajanakorn et al. [33] designed
a deep neural network to map any audio into mouth shapes and
convincing facial expressions, to impose an arbitrary speech on
a video clip of a speaking actor, with results hard to distinguish,
to the human eye, from genuine footage. Thies et al. [34] show-
cased a technique for real-time facial reenactment, to convincingly
re-render the synthesized target face on top of the corresponding
Political manipulation. In a peer-reviewed study published on
November 7, 2016 [6] (the day before the U.S. presidential
election), I unveiled a massive-scale spam operation affecting
the American political Twitter. With the aid of Botometer, an
AI system that leverages over a thousand features to separate
bots from humans [35], hundreds of thousands of bots were
identified. By studying the activity signatures of these bots, I
noted that they were being retweeted at the same rate than
human users, which may have contributed to the spread of
political misinformation [36]. Since most of these bots aimed
at sowing chaos, their presence may have inflamed and fur-
ther polarized the political conversation, with unknown
consequences on the integrity of the vote. Since then, dozens
of studies corroborated these results; many other studies,
before and after mine, showed the perils associated with
social spam campaigns in political domains. Most recently,
the emerging phenomenon of fake news spreading attracted
a lot of attention. Vosoughi et al. [36] investigated the role
of social media, as well as bots, in the spread of true and
false news: the authors showed that humans are more likely
to share false stories inspired by fear, disgust, and surprise.
This suggests that conditioning and manipulation operations
online can affect human behavior.
Public heath. Conspiracy and denialism are endemic of so-
cial networks. Spam in public health discussions has become
commonplace for social media: in a recent study, for example,
my team highlighted how bots are used to promote elec-
tronic cigarettes as cessation devices with health benefits, a
fact not definitively corroborated by science [2]. The use of
bots to carry out anti vaccination campaigns has been the
subject of investigation of a DARPA Challenge in 2016 [32].
Stock market. Automatic trading algorithms leverage infor-
mation from social media to predict stock prices. Using bots,
spam campaigns have been carried out to give the false im-
pression that certain stocks were spoken positively about
on Twitter, successfully tricking trading algorithms into buy-
ing them in a pump-and-dump scheme unveiled by the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 2015 [15].
Data leaks. Social platforms enable the often unwilling disclo-
sure of private user information. A recent study showed that
over a third of content shared on Facebook has the default
public-visibility privacy settings [28]. The amount of content
accessible to undesirable users may be even higher when
considering privacy settings that allow one’s friends to access
private information and preferences: Research showed that
most users indiscriminately accept friendship connections on
Facebook [18]. Spam bots can inject themselves into tightly-
connected communities, by leveraging the weak-tie structure
of online social networks [12], and obtain private user infor-
mation on large swaths of users. Phishing is also responsible
for data leaks. Attacks based on short-URLs are popular on
social media: they can hide the true identity of the spammers
and have been proven effective to steal personal data [9, 19].
Social Spam Applications
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Figure 2: Video sequence real-time reenactment using AI
(From [34]). This proof-of-concept technology could be
abused to create AI-fueled multimedia spam.
original video stream (see Figure 2). These techniques, and their evo-
lutions [25], have been then exploited to create so-called DeepFakes,
face-swaps of celebrities into adult content videos that surfaced
on the Internet by the end of 2017. Such techniques have also al-
ready been applied to the political domain, creating fictitious video
footage re-enacting Obama,4 Trump, and Putin,5 among several
world leaders [25]. Concerns about the ethical and legal conundra
of these new technologies have been already expressed [8].
In the future, these technologiesmay be abused bywell-resourced
spammers to create AIs pretending to be human. Another example:
Google recently demonstrated the ability to deploy an AI (Google
Duplex™) in the real world to act as a virtual assistant, seamlessly
interacting with human interlocutors over the phone:6 such technol-
ogy may likely be re-purposed to carry out massive scale spam-call
campaigns. Other forms of future spamwith AI may use augmented
or virtual reality agents, so-called Digital Humans, to interact with
humans in digital and virtual spaces, to promote products/services,
and in worse-case scenarios to carry out nefarious campaigns simi-
lar to those of today’s bots, to manipulate and influence users.
4.2 Spamming into AI
AIs based on Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are sophisticated
systems whose functioning can sometimes be too complex to ex-
plain or debug. For such a reason, ANNs can be easy preys of various
forms of attacks, including spam, to elicit undesirable, even harmful
system’s behaviors. An example of spamming into AI can be bias
exacerbation: one of the major problems of modern-days AIs (and,
in general, of supervised learning approaches based on Big Data) is
that biases learned from training data will propagate into predic-
tions. The problem of bias [5], especially in AI, is under the spotlight
and is being tackled by the computing research community.7 One
way an AI can be maliciously led to learn biased models is deliber-
ately injecting spam—here intended as unwanted information—into
the training data: this may lead the system to learn undesirable
patterns and biases, which will affect the AI system’s behavior in
line with the intentions of the spammers.
An alternative way of spamming into AI is the manipulation
of test data. If an attacker has a good understanding of the limits
of an AI system, for example by having access to its training data
and thus the ability to learn strength and weakness of the learned
models, attacks can be designed to lure the AI into an undesirable
4See https://grail.cs.washington.edu/projects/AudioToObama
5See http://niessnerlab.org/projects/thies2016face.html
6https://ai.googleblog.com/2018/05/duplex-ai-system-for-natural-conversation.html
7https://www.technologyreview.com/s/608986/forget-killer-robotsbias-is-the-real-ai-danger
Figure 3: Physical-world attacks onto AI visual classifier
(From [14]). Similar techniques could be abused to inject un-
wanted spam into AI and trigger anomalous behaviors.
state. Figure 3 shows an example of a physical-world attack that af-
fects an AI system’s behaviors in anomalous and undesirable ways
[14]: in this case, a deep neural network for image classification
(which may have been used, for example, to control an autonomous
vehicle) is tricked by a “perturbed” stop sign mistakenly interpreted
as a speed limit sign—according to the expectation of the attacker.
Spam test data may be displayed to a victim AI system to lure it
into behaving according to a scripted plot based on weaknesses
of the models and/or of its underlying data. The potential appli-
cations of such type of spam attacks can be in medical domains
(e.g., deliberate misreading of scans), autonomous mobility (e.g.,
attacks on the transportation infrastructure or the vehicles), and
more. Depending on the pervasiveness of AI-fueled systems in the
future, the questions related to spamming into AI may require the
immediate attention of the research community.
5 RECOMMENDATIONS
Four decades have passed since the first case of email spam was
reported by 400 ARPANET users (cf. Figure 1). While some promi-
nent computer scientists (including Bill Gates) thought that spam
would quickly be solved and soon remembered as a problem of the
past [10], we have witnessed its evolution in a variety of forms and
environments. Spam feeds itself of (economic, political, ideological,
etc.) incentives and of new technologies, both of which there is no
shortage of, and therefore it is likely to plague our society and our
systems for the foreseeable future.
It is therefore the duty of the computing community to enact
policies and research programs to keep fighting against the prolif-
eration of current and new forms of spam. I conclude suggesting
three maxims that may guide future efforts in this endeavor:
1. Design technology with abuse in mind. Evidence seems to sug-
gest that, in the computing world, new powerful technologies are
oftentimes abused beyond their original scope. Most modern-days
technologies, like the Internet, the Web, email, and social media,
have not been designed with built-in protection against attacks or
spam. However, we cannot perpetuate a naive view of the world
that ignores ill-intentioned attackers: new systems and technologies
shall be designed from their inception with abuse in mind.
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2. Don’t forget the arms-race. The fight against spam is a constant
arms-race between attackers and defenders, and as in most adver-
sarial settings, the party with the highest stakes will prevail: since
with each new technology comes abuse, researchers shall anticipate
the need for counter-measures to avoid being caught unprepared
when spammers will abuse their newly-designed technologies.
3. Blockchain technologies. The ability to carry out massive spam
attacks in most systems exists predominantly due to the lack of au-
thenticationmeasures that reliably guarantee the identity of entities
and the legitimacy of transactions on the system. The Blockchain
as a proof-of-work mechanism to authenticate digital personas (in-
cluding in virtual realities), AIs, etc. may prevent several forms of
spam and mitigate the scale and impact of others.8
Spam is here to stay: let’s fight it together!
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